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The Oslo Accords: A Modern-Day Story of Occupation Told
Through Violations of the Right to Freedom of Privacy
CATHERINE DEMETROVICH*
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict began in the early 1900s when the disputed land,
what is now the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, fell under British rule. After the SixDay War in 1967, Israel took control of the West Bank, Golan Heights, and the Gaza
Strip. Since then, tensions between Israel and Palestine have continued to grow. This
Note explores a modern-day occupation question: Israel’s control over Palestine’s
information and communication technology (ICT) sector. Along with privacy and
human rights violations, Israel’s control is in direct violation of the Oslo Accords—
guaranteeing Palestinians limited self-governance in Gaza and the West Bank. Since
the current legislative structure and international efforts do not provide adequate
support, this Note suggests several recommendations to promote Palestine’s ICT
sector: clarified legislation, support from international actors, increased social
media presence, and steps to take at the local level.
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INTRODUCTION
International legal frameworks, such as the Hague Conventions and the Fourth
Geneva Convention, exist to govern situations of occupation. 1 However, these
legislations were written at a time before data privacy became a source of conflict.
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) identify the existence
of a right to privacy. 2 Specifically, Article 17 states that “no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interferences with their privacy.” 3 Technology continues to

1. See generally AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: RETHINKING THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2017).
2. Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection Under International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW 462, 467 (Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli & Pavle Kilibarda eds., 2022).
3. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 17, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
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progress, and occupations, such as Israel’s occupation of Palestine, so frequently
change course that the current legislative framework struggles to stay relevant. It has
been previously stated that “[t]he story of occupation . . . can be told through the
story of the restrictions on freedom of movement.”4 The law of occupation should
also consider technological shifts.5 The story of occupation should, therefore, factor
in technology and be told through the story of the freedom of privacy, or lack thereof.
This Note focuses on one aspect of the development of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict: the information and communication technology (ICT) sector. Part I of this
Note provides the necessary background to understand the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and the ICT sector. Part II highlights an example of traditional occupation
law, the construction of the separation barrier, and how the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) created an opportunity for
discourse through their differing decisions. Using the Oslo Accords, Part III
highlights a controversy within the ICT sector, exemplifying a prevalent conflict
under occupation law. Part IV concludes by providing different recommendations
and factors to consider when analyzing future violations in this area of occupation
law.
I. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT AND ICT SECTOR DEFINED
A. The History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The current conflict has been previously described in three ways: the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the Jewish-Islamic conflict.6
However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflects a more recent dispute about land
ownership.7 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict refers to the dispute between two peoples
of different nationalities, while the Israeli-Arab description encompasses the conflict
between Israelis and all Arabs.8 Lastly, the Jewish-Islamic conflict refers to the
dispute between two religions, specifically regarding the Muslim religion’s
disapproval of a Jewish state.9 Muslims, Jews, and Christians all shared this disputed
land under the Ottoman Empire; however, when it fell in 1918 after the end of World
War I, the land came under British rule.
Britain began instigating disputes between Palestinians and Zionists by making
conflicting agreements.10 Overall, the modern state of Israel was developed to
correlate with the main Zionist goal: “to establish a modern, independent state for

(Dec. 16, 1966).
4. GROSS, supra note 1, at 258.
5. Id. at 129.
6. Pinhas Inbari, On the Roots of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 28 JEWISH POL. STUD.
REV. 66, 66 (2017).
7. Kandace Redd, The Complex History of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, ABC10 (July
12, 2021, 5:54 PM), https://www.abc10.com/article/news/community/race-and-culture/needto-know-the-israel-and-palestine-conflict/103-79ca68a9-31c4-4adb-9b74-99e26b16cebf
[https://perma.cc/54D5-JAYB].
8. Inbari, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. Redd, supra note 7.
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the Jews in the land of their forefathers.” 11 In 1919, the Zionists’ motive was to
establish a Jewish state for the fifteen million Jews across the world. 12 This motive
corresponds directly with the Jewish ideology that calls for “a return to the land,”
which further explains their disapproval of a Palestinian state. 13 Accordingly, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a long, complex history.
In all but six months of Palestine’s history, Israel has maintained some portion of
military control over this territory. 14 More specifically, since 1967 Israel has
controlled the West Bank and Gaza Strip.15 The conflict between Israel and Palestine
began after World War I when both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip became part
of British-mandated Palestine. However, the Jews fleeing Nazi Europe after World
War II demanded a homeland in Palestine, which was dominated by Arabs. In 1947,
the British mandate ended, and the land was partitioned as follows: fifty-three
percent to Israel and forty-seven percent to Palestine.16 This officially established
two states in Palestine—a Jewish State and an Arab State.17 Since the Arab countries
disapproved of a Jewish-majority state in the Middle East, Jewish parliamentary
groups stormed Israel by force, causing the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. Egypt, Iraq,
Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan were involved in this war; however, Israel won and
retained control of its land.18 By 1949, Israel controlled seventy-eight percent of what
was historically Palestine. Furthermore, Israel won the Six-Day War in 1967, which
gave Israel control of the West Bank, Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip. 19 The SixDay War also led to “secured and recognized boundaries” for Israel through UN
Resolution 242.20
B. The Information and Communications Technology Sector
Israel’s control over Palestine has limited Palestine’s development of its
information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure. The ICT sector is
defined as “[the] combination of manufacturing and service industries that capture,
transmit, and display data and information electronically.” 21 The industry has been

11. Id. at 75.
12. Id. at 75–76.
13. Id. at 76.
14. HUM. RTS. WATCH, A THRESHOLD CROSSED: ISRAELI AUTHORITIES AND THE CRIMES
OF APARTHEID AND PERSECUTION 2 (2021).
15. Pia Krishnankutty, What Israel-Palestine Conflict Is All About and Why Both Want
West Bank & Gaza Strip, THE PRINT (Nov. 21, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://theprint.in/theprintessential/what-israel-palestine-conflict-is-all-about-and-why-both-want-west-bank-gazastrip/323825/ [https://perma.cc/RL6K-FWBY].
16. Id.
17. Gideon Biger, The Boundaries of Israel Palestine Past, Present, and Future: A
Critical Geographical View, 13 ISR. STUD. 68, 81 (2008).
18. Id. at 88.
19. Jeremy Bowen, 1967 War: Six Days That Changed the Middle East, BBC NEWS (June
5, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461 [https://perma.cc/LQ594JV7].
20. Biger, supra note 17, at 83.
21. ORG. OF ECON. COOP. AND DEV., Annex 1. The OECD Definition of the ICT Sector, in
THE
INFORMATION
ECONOMY
2002
81,
81
(2002),
MEASURING
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described as a pillar of other sectors, enabling development and prosperity in areas
such as agriculture, transportation, health, and education, among others.22
Additionally, there is a positive correlation between direct investments in the ICT
sector and job creation. Specifically, a new job in ICT creates three jobs in other
sectors.23 The leading subsectors of the Palestinian ICT sector are telecommunication
equipment, computer hardware, software, networking equipment, and audiovisual
equipment.24
II. A BALANCING ACT: DIFFERENT COURTS’ JUDGMENTS REGARDING THE
SEPARATION BARRIER
Although Israel’s impact on the Palestinian ICT sector represents one side of
occupation, the construction of the separation barrier shows that the Palestinians
continue to face a traditional restriction on their freedom of movement. This Part
highlights the immediate harms faced by Palestinians, while also exemplifying the
motives behind Israel’s actions. It concludes by explaining the differing judgments
by the International Court of Justice and the Israeli High Court of Justice to
emphasize the logical reasoning behind both. These clashing narratives emphasize
that, despite both sides’ motives, the legal analysis should extend beyond the current
legal framework.
A. Palestinian Harms
In June 2002, Israel erected the separation barrier around the West Bank.25 The
separation barrier has posed many immediate harms towards the Palestinians.26 For
example, the barrier damaged Palestinians’ olive groves and water wells, thereby
harming the agricultural and food production industries.27 Additionally, the barrier
has immediately cut community ties by separating neighbors from one another. 28
More generally, it impedes Palestinians’ access to essential facilities such as work,
school, and medical services.29

https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2771153.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9K4-KYDH].
22. Nur Arafeh, Wassim F. Abdullah & Sam Bahour, ICT: The Shackled Engine of
Palestine’s Development, AL-SHABAKA (Nov. 9, 2015), https://al-shabaka.org/summaries/ictthe-shackled-engine-of-palestines-development/ [https://perma.cc/3MKK-WD58].
23. Id.
24. Information and Communication Technology (ICT), INT’L TRADE ADMIN. (Sept. 13,
2020), https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/west-bank-information-and-communicatio
n -technology-ict [https://perma.cc/STH8-LFFR].
25. The
Separation
Barrier,
B’TSELEM
(Nov.
11,
2017),
https://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier [https://perma.cc/NML3-TXTH]; see also Max
Karpefors & Micheline van Riemsdijk, ‘We Are Not Free Here…’ – Palestinian IT Student
(Im)mobile Transition from University to Employment or Further Education, 33 J. EDUC. &
WORK 19, 22 (2020).
26. See DAVID KRETZMER & YAËL RONEN, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME
COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2021).
27. Id. at 235.
28. See id.
29. Id.
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Palestinians also face travel restrictions because of new obstacles regarding their
passports and necessary permits. 30 The barrier prevents Palestinians from traveling
from the West Bank to Israel without a permit. 31 Resultingly, Palestinians have faced
difficulties in receiving medical treatment.32 More specifically, doctors can only
travel through the gates to the West Bank during opening hours, their visits must be
prearranged, and there are not any arrangements for medical emergencies.33
Palestinians have also been unable to travel for extended family members’
gatherings, such as weddings or funerals.34 Along with the separation barrier, they
also face obstacles such as “[f]ixed and flying checkpoints, earth mounds, trenches,
road gates, [and] roadblocks.”35
In order to travel, Palestinians must hold the “right” identification card.36
Palestinians living in the West Bank or Gaza Strip have green identification cards,
and Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and Israel have blue identification cards.
The green ID provides Palestinians access to travel to only thirty-seven countries,
which makes it “one of the most restricted passports globally.” 37 Additionally, the
West Bank does not have an airport or seaport, so Palestinians must attempt to travel
to Jordan or apply for an Israeli permit to reach the airport.38 However, Israel, without
any specific reason, has withdrawn permits and/or denied travel. 39
B. Israeli Motives
Palestinians might face immediate harms, but Israel also suggests legitimate
motives for the erection of this barrier. In March 2002, there was the second highest
number of Israeli casualties due to terrorist attacks.40 Between September 2000 and
July 2003, there were 73 terrorist attacks in which 293 Israelis were killed and 1950
were wounded.41 Resultingly, proposals for the separation barrier began. In April
2002, the Israeli government first began adopting plans of construction. 42 The
government’s national security cabinet explained that the construction’s motive was

30. See Karpefors & van Riemsdijk, supra note 25, at 22.
31. See Arafeh et al., supra note 22.
32. KRETZMER & RONEN, supra note 26, at 236.
33. GROSS, supra note 1, at 290.
34. KRETZMER & RONEN, supra note 26, at 236.
35. Arafeh et al., supra note 22.
36. Karpefors & van Riemsdijk, supra note 25, at 22. The blue ID provides access to both
Israel and the West Bank, while the green ID does not give access to Jerusalem or Israel. See
Linah Alsaafin, The Colour-Coded Israeli ID Systems for Palestinians, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 18,
2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/18/the-colour-coded-israeli-id-system-forpalestinians [https://perma.cc/9Q7G-VGYR].
37. Karpefors & van Riemsdijk, supra note 25, at 22.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. KRETZMER & RONEN, supra note 26, at 233.
41. Anti-Terrorist Fence Cuts Samaria-Based Attacks by 90%, ISRAELI MISSIONS
AROUND THE WORLD (July 5, 2004), https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/FOREIGNPOLICY/
Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Anti-terrorist%20fence%20cuts%20Samaria-based%20attacks
%20by%2090%20percent.aspx [https://perma.cc/P3GR-Q54X].
42. KRETZMER & RONEN, supra note 26, at 234.

2022]

O SLO AC C O RD S

313

“to frustrate, disrupt and prevent entry of terrorist activities from the Judea and
Samaria area into Israel.”43
Although construction has not concluded, Israel has already seen a decrease in
terrorist attacks. Palestinian terrorists have admitted that the barrier serves as a
deterrent.44 Between August 2003 and June 2004, only three terrorist attacks were
successful, and they all occurred in the first half of 2003 when construction had just
begun.45 More generally, the number of terrorist attacks has declined by ninety
percent, and the number of Israelis killed and injured has decreased by around
seventy percent after construction began.46
C. The Clash of Two Courts
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principle judicial organ of the United
Nations (UN), and the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ), the Supreme Court in
Jerusalem, both released opinions regarding the construction of the separation
barrier. 47 Although the ICJ’s advisory opinion is not binding, the HCJ still attempted
to accredit it with appropriate weight. 48 Both statements rely on a similar foundation
but reach different conclusions. Both courts agree on the premise that “the harm to
the Palestinian residents would not be a violation of international law if it served a
military need, national security or public order.” 49 However, the ICJ proposed the
separation barrier to be looked at in its entirety, while the HCJ stressed that each
segment of the barrier should be looked at individually. 50 The main differences
between the opinions will be discussed below.
The HCJ first considered at the legality of the separation barrier in Beit Sourik in
which the land of eight villages was seized to build the barrier. 51 In looking at the
history of the events, the HCJ analyzed this issue as one of Israeli safety, citing the
death and injury toll on its citizens.52 However, it made significant strides toward
progress, away from its tendency to adjudicate claims brought by Palestinians.53 In

43. Id. (quoting HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel, 58(5)
PD 807 (2004) (Isr.)).
44. Mitchell Bard, West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon Security Barriers: Background &
Overview, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIB., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-andoverview-of-israel-s-security-fence [https://perma.cc/H6JR-G2RP]. Abdullah Ramadan
Shalah, Islamic Jihad leader, stated, “[T]here is the separation fence, which is an obstacle to
the resistance, and if it were not there the situation would be entirely different.” Id.
45. See ISRAELI MISSIONS, supra note 41.
46. Id.
47. See generally HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel,
58(5) PD 807 (2004) (Isr.); see also HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (2005)
(Isr.).
48. GROSS, supra note 1, at 303 (stating that the ICJ’s opinion was “an interpretation of
international law, performed by the highest judicial body in international law” that “should be
given its full appropriate weight”) (quoting HCJ 7957/04 at ¶ 56).
49. KRETZMER & RONEN, supra note 26, at 249 (quoting HCJ 7957/04 at ¶ 57).
50. See GROSS, supra note 1, at 303–04.
51. Id. at 277–78; see also HCJ 2056/04.
52. GROSS, supra note 1, at 279.
53. Id. at 288.
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its decision, the HCJ acknowledged the injuries to Palestinians and offered an
alternative route.54 Instead of solely striking down the Palestinian village’s claim, the
court analyzed different considerations, such as security needs and the rights of local
populations, when making its decision.55
On July 9, 2004, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion stating that Israel’s separation
barrier is illegal and ordered a stop to the construction. 56 Additionally, the ICJ
demanded that Israel make reparations for all damage caused.57 In a fourteen-to-one
majority, the ICJ found the barrier to be a breach of international law and a violation
of the principles of the UN Charter. 58 Overall, the court found that the construction
“alters the demographic composition of the occupied Palestinian territory and
impedes the Palestinians’ right to self-determination.”59 Additionally, voting
thirteen-to-two, the court decided that states should not recognize this illegal
situation or give any assistance to maintain the current situation. 60
The HCJ went further to incorporate the ICJ advisory opinion into its next case:
Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel.61 In this case, the barrier cut off several
Palestinian villages from the rest of the West Bank.62 Overall, the HCJ recognized
that the decrease in the number of terrorist attacks after the construction of the
separation barrier proves that it is effective as a security measure. 63 In other words,
it explained that if the barrier fulfills military needs, then the military commander
can take possession of the land. The court also stressed the temporary nature of the
occupation.64 However, even though the HCJ found the barrier justified on security
grounds, it asked respondents to reconsider the existing route and the possibility of
alternatives that will result in less injury.65
As displayed above, the courts’ decisions provide a clear example of clashing
narratives, mainly caused by the vast complexities of a deep-rooted conflict. In
accordance with the Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the ICJ
determined that Israel must protect the human rights of those in the occupied
territory, and the building of the separation barrier infringes on many of those
rights.66 Conversely, the HCJ focused more on the harm to the Palestinians. Using a
proportionality analysis in both landmark cases, the HCJ found that Israeli security

54. Id.
55. Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel et. al., HCJ 2056/04,
Supreme Court, 20 June 2004, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/09d47365bd
007706c12575c20046ec2a [https://perma.cc/ZE8B-Y46J].
56. International Court of Justice Finds Israeli Barrier in Palestinian Territory Is Illegal,
UN NEWS (July 9, 2004), https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/07/108912-international-courtjustice-finds-israeli-barrier-palestinian-territory-illegal [https://perma.cc/KU2C-CLUY].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. GROSS, supra note 1, at 289; see also HCJ 7957/04.
62. GROSS, supra note 1, at 289.
63. Id. at 291.
64. Id.
65. HCJ 7957/04 ¶ 115–16.
66. See HCJ 2056/04 ¶ 67.

2022]

O SLO AC C O RD S

315

concerns did not outweigh the harms caused.67 The courts’ differing opinions have
opened a gateway for discourse regarding the legality of the separation barrier and
the factors that should be used in legal analysis.
III. A CASE STUDY: ISRAEL’S TREATMENT OF PALESTINE IN RELATION TO THE OSLO
ACCORDS
Part III of this Note provides an example of the inability of current legislation to
solve a modern question of occupation—the restriction of the freedom of privacy.
This Part also poses that, like the immediate harms felt by the Palestinians after the
erection of the separation barrier, Palestinian development has been hindered due to
Israel’s control over its ICT sector.
A. The Development of the Oslo Accords
After obtaining control in 1949, Israel built Jewish settlements in the newly
occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), which includes the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.68 However, in 1993 the Oslo Accords were formalized, which gave partial
control of the West Bank to Palestine.69 The Oslo Accords are a set of two
agreements signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in
which the PLO agreed to formally recognize Israel as a state, and Israel allowed
Palestine a form of limited self-governance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.70 The
Oslo Accords were ratified twice: Oslo I in Washington, D.C. in 1993 and Oslo II in
Taba, Egypt in 1995. Oslo II divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C. As
shown in Figure 1, Area A is under Palestinian control. Palestinian and Israeli
authorities share control over Area B. Lastly, Area C, which covers around sixty
percent of the West Bank, is under complete Israeli control. 71 In Oslo I, the parties
established an interim period with parameters of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza,
which was set to end in 1999. However, the Accords are still used to govern daily
relations between the two parties.72
The Oslo Accords are particularly relevant in reference to Israel and the PLO’s
telecommunications sectors. Article 36 of Annex III sets out provisions for the
telecommunications sector within oPt.73 The Joint Technical Committee (JTC) was

67. See HCJ 7957/04.
68. Id.
69. ANAN ABUSHANAB, CONNECTION INTERRUPTED: ISRAEL’S CONTROL OF THE
PALESTINIAN ICT INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON DIGITAL RIGHTS 10 (Alison Ramer ed.,
Muna Abu Baker, trans., 2018).
70. Oslo Accords, HISTORY (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/middleeast/oslo-accords [https://perma.cc/W7AD-N73M].
71. What Are Area A, Area B, and Area C in the West Bank, ANERA,
https://www.anera.org/what-are-area-a-area-b-and-area-c-in-the-west-bank/
[https://perma.cc/FV74-DJPN].
72. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Annex
III, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, art. 36(A), Sep. 28, 1995 [hereinafter Oslo
Accords].
73. Id.
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established to preside as technical experts in the event of any issues; however, it has
proven to be inadequate and ineffective.74 Instead of acting in accordance with the
stated provisions, Israel has tightened its control over the ICT sector, further limiting
Palestinians’ access to services as well as hampering the industry’s development.75
Figure 1: Map displaying the division of land per the Oslo Accords

B. Analysis of Article 36 Governing the ICT Sector
Oslo II granted the Palestinians direct control over their ICT sector, but certain
conditions within the agreement restrict any actual progress being made.76 Each of
the subsections outlined below provide Palestine with certain rights; however, they
each have their own problems.77

74. ABUSHANAB, supra note 69, at 13–14.
75. Id. at 14.
76. MASHHOUR ABUDAKA, THE EFFECT OF THE PA’S DISSOLUTION OR COLLAPSE ON
TELECOMMUNICATION AND POSTAL SERVICES 3 (2013); see also Oslo Accords, supra note 72,
art. 36(D)(2) (“The equipment will be used only when the independent Palestinian network is
operational.”).
77. See Oslo Accords, supra note 72.
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1. “Israel recognizes that the Palestinian side has the right to build and operate
separate and independent communication systems and infrastructures
including telecommunication networks, a television network and a radio
network.”78
Under the Oslo Accords, the Palestine Telecommunications Company (“Paltel”)
was granted a twenty-year license “to build, operate and own landlines, data
communications, paging services, public telephones, satellite communication
services, lease lines, sell telecommunications equipment (peripheral devices), ValueAdded Services (VAS) and deploy and operate a mobile network.” 79 With this
license, Paltel established Jawwal, Palestine’s first mobile operator, in August 1999.
Unfortunately, even after this establishment, there have been strong constraints over
these companies.80
Around ten years after the first request was made, Israel finally agreed to allow
Palestine access to Third Generation (3G) in the West bank.81 The Israeli government
mainly attributed this long denial of access to “security issues,” explaining the need
to ensure Israeli safety.82 Israel also claimed that it did not have enough frequency to
allow for 3G networks. Overall, the Oslo Accords only allow Palestine limited access
to its own frequencies, which Israel has been able to take advantage of to maintain
its hold over the Palestinian ICT sector.83
Additionally, in 2006, Wataniya Mobile Palestine (“Wataniya”) was granted
access to a 2G and 3G mobile license in Palestinian territories. 84 The license was
granted in March 2007, but Wataniya could not launch its services until November
2009 due to a delay caused by Israeli authorities. Until 2009, the Palestinian mobile
market was one of the few markets in the world with a single national mobile
operator.85 Until 2017, Wataniya did not have the authority to operate in the Gaza
Strip.86 Therefore, before this development, a monopoly continued to exist in

78. Id. at 36(B)(1).
79. WORLD BANK GRP., THE TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR IN THE PALESTINIAN
TERRITORIES: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15 (2016) (citation
omitted).
80. See Arafeh et al., supra note 22.
81. ABUSHANAB, supra note 69, at 15, 24.
82. Saed Bannoura, Israel Agrees to Allow Palestinian Telecommunication Companies
Access to 3G, IMEMC (Nov. 20, 2015), https://imemc.org/article/73932/
[https://perma.cc/F4DS-SALA].
83. Id.
84. The “G” stands for generation. 2G devices have data speed up to 64 kilobytes, while
3G devices have data speed up to 8 megabits. See What Are the Differences Between 2G, 3G,
4G LTE, and 5G Networks?, RANTCELL, https://rantcell.com/comparison-of-2g-3g-4g5g.html [https://perma.cc/H3P2-KD2B ]. 1 megabit is 1000 times faster than 1 kilobyte. What
is the Difference Between Mbps and Kbps?, VERIZON, https://www. verizon.com/
about/blog/mbps-vs-kbps [https://perma.cc/GD3C-6CV8].
85. WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 79, at 16.
86. Nidal al-Mughrabi, Second Palestinian Mobile Operator Launches in Gaza, REUTERS
(Oct.
24,
2017,
7:17
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/palestinians-gazamobilephone/second-palestinian-mobile-operator-launches-in-gaza-idUSL8N1MX0CO
[https://perma.cc/23WH-5PLF].
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Palestine.87 Additionally, customers of the West Bank did not have access to 3G
services through a Palestinian company until 2018.88
Figure 2: Frequency Allocated Between Cellular Providers

2. “Without prejudice to subparagraph D.5.c of this section, the Palestinian
side has the right to establish satellite networks for various services, excluding
international services.”89
Israel’s control has most significantly impacted Palestine’s electromagnetic
spectrum, specifically relating to its mobile network opportunities. Generally, if a
telecommunications bandwidth operator has more spectrum bandwidth, then it can
serve more subscribers.90 More specifically, a lower band frequency, such as 800 to
900 megahertz (MHz), is more desirable than a higher band frequency of 1800 to
2100 MHz. The major problem exists in how the spectrum is divided because it must
be balanced between military, science, government, and private companies.91 When
Jawwal was established, Israel licensed the operator access to 4.8 MHz in the 900
MHz band for 120,000 subscribers.92 Jawwal now caters to more than 2.5 million

87. Helga Tawil-Souri, Digital Occupation: Gaza’s High-Tech Enclosure, 41 J.
PALESTINIAN STUD. 27, 27–43 (2012).
88. Ali Sawafta, Palestinians Get 3G Mobile Services in West Bank, REUTERS (Jan. 24,
2018, 7:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-palestinians-telecom/palestiniansget-3g-mobile-services-in-west-bank-idUSL8N1PJ3FW [https://perma.cc/368H-ZUEB].
89. Oslo Accords, supra note 72, art. 36(B)(2).
90. ABUDAKA, supra note 76, at 5.
91. Id.
92. Arafeh et al., supra note 22.
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customers with the same access. In comparison, in 2009, Israel’s primary cellular
company, Cellcom Isr, had access to 37 MHz for its nearly 3 million subscribers. 93
Additionally, Israel also limited Wataniya’s access: Israel granted it 1.8 MHz in the
900 MHz band and 2.8 MHz in the 1800 MHz band. It was also unable to start its
operations for two years due to delays in these licensing agreements.94
Israel also denied the deployment of Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access (“WiMax”) systems, which “provide access to wireless broadband networks
and allow for the high-speed transmission of data across networks and
applications.”95 Around the world, most countries now use LTE and 4G systems
instead of WiMax; however, Palestinians do not have access to these either, while
Israeli customers do. Overall, these restrictions violate the Oslo Accords, since
Article 36(b) allows Palestine the right to establish satellite networks.
3. “The Palestinian side has the right to establish its own telecommunications
policies, systems and infrastructures. The Palestinian side also has the right to
choose any and all kinds of communication systems (including broadcasting
systems) and technologies, suitable for its future in, inter alia, basic and value
added services (including cellular telephony).”96
Along with Israel maintaining strict control over Palestine’s mobile networks,
Israel also has established significant control over Palestinians’ access to radio.97
There was a transmitter located in Ramallah, Palestine; however, Israel damaged it
in 2000 and destroyed it and its transmitter room in 2002. 98 Israel has now limited
Palestinians’ radio access to FM frequencies. Resultingly, Palestinians are less able
to broadcast throughout the region due to hills and other built-up areas blocking most
FM coverage.99 Lastly, Israel also continues to use Palestine’s medium wave radio
frequency to broadcast its own messages.100 Since Article 36(c) gives Palestine the
right to choose its own communication systems, Israel’s control seems to contradict
the Oslo Accords.
4. “Operators and providers of services, presently and in the future, in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be required to obtain the necessary approvals
from the Palestinian side. In addition, all those operating and/or providing
services, presently and in the future, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who
wish to operate and/or provide services in Israel, are required to obtain the
necessary approvals from the Israeli Ministry of Communications.”101

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. ABUSHANAB, supra note 69, at 16.
96. Oslo Accords, supra note 72, art. 36(B)(3).
97. Arafeh et al., supra note 22.
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99. Phil Reeves, Israel Blows Up Palestinians’ Radio Station, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 20,
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Palestine’s inability to gain Israel’s approval to obtain the necessary equipment
to build its independent network has drastically inhibited development, mainly due
to unnecessary delays.102 In the early 2000s, it would take around one to two months
to gain approval for the ICT equipment; however, the process has been cut down to
around thirty days. Despite the shorter time frame for approval, the process is still
complex because of the various documents that Palestinians must provide, such as:
“a certificate of origin; an invoice; an air waybill; a packing list with details on the
quantities imported and their standards, which should comply with Israeli standards;
explanation of the need of the product and information regarding the end-user.”103
Therefore, Palestinian shippers endure severe time delays.104 Additionally, this
request must go through many different agencies, including the Coordination of
Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), the Israeli Ministry of
Communications, and the Standards Institution of Israel.105
Each shipment must also get its own approval. For example, two shipments of the
same product require approval for each shipment. Another restriction imposed on
Palestinian shippers is the Israeli-defined “dual-use items” list.106 Dual-use items
refer to products that can be used for both military and civilian purposes. These items
are either prohibited or subject to even lengthier security measures. Ironically, most
of these products can be purchased off-the-shelf within Israel.107
Palestinian operators also face constraints in the approvals needed for
infrastructure development. More specifically, these operators are not able to build
infrastructure within Area C, which means a loss of around 100,000 Palestinian
customers who reside there as well as the 2.5 million Palestinians who use roads
through Area C to travel.108 Although the Israeli authorities have changed the
process, it continues to be lengthy and unpredictable. For example, out of the fiftyseven sites requested by Jawwal, only one has been installed since 2014.109
Therefore, most households in Area C are forced to rely on Israeli companies
instead.110
5. “Both sides shall refrain from any action that interferes with the
communication and broadcasting systems and infrastructures of the other
side.”111
Since Israel has only approved the necessary infrastructure for 2G and 3G systems
throughout Palestinian territories, networks are fragmented. This results in customers
relying on Israeli companies because they cannot talk when traveling between cities
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or living in isolated areas.112 Israel has also restricted the construction of switches—
equipment that connects multiple devices to the same network.113 Therefore, cellular
providers have resorted to building switches in other countries, which has led to
greater costs and longer routing of calls.114
Although Israel maintains a certain amount of control over both the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, Gaza’s infrastructure is completely dependent on Israel.115 More
specifically, Gaza’s situation has been described as “a regime of digital
occupation.”116 All telephone calls are routed through Israel, and all internet switches
used are located outside of the Gaza Strip, which leads to the similar high costs
experienced by Jawwal and Wataniya. In 2009, between twenty and forty percent of
people living in Gaza used Israeli cellular services because of the cheaper prices. 117
Despite the cheaper prices, a Gazan user must pay about twice as much as an Israeli
customer using the same plan.118 Additionally, the Israeli cellular providers provide
much stronger signals than provided by Jawwal.119 It has been estimated that between
2008 and 2009, the damage to the Gazan economy was around $10 million USD. 120
Because Israel has control over Gaza’s ICT sector, it has also increased its
dominance over citizens individually. For example, Israel can and has shut down or
interrupted Gaza’s telecommunications networks for various reasons.121 During
Israel’s military offenses, the Israeli military sent messages to warn Gazans of the
attack.122 In 2008–09, it also used radio broadcasts, phone calls, and text messages
to warn Palestinians to evacuate areas before an attack; however, the military still
did not give them enough time to evacuate or take the necessary precautions.123
6. “A joint committee of technical experts representing both sides shall be
established to address any issue arising out of this section including the growing
future needs of the Palestinian side (hereinafter referred to as “the Joint
Technical Committee” or JTC). The JTC shall meet on a regular basis for the
purpose of solving all relevant problems, and as necessary in order to solve
urgent problems.”124
As previously stated, the JTC has proven to be unsuccessful in aiding Palestine’s
development under the Oslo Accords. The JTC was intended to be made up of the
Israeli Ministry of Communications (MoC), the Palestinian Ministry of

112. ABUSHANAB, supra note 69, at 17.
113. What Is a Network Switch? Switch vs. Router, CLOUDFLARE,
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/network-layer/what-is-a-network-switch/
[https://perma.cc/W52Z-V8DM].
114. ABUSHANAB, supra note 69, at 17.
115. Id.
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Telecommunications and Information Technologies (MTIT), and COGAT with
additional occasional observers.125 Although the accords require that the JTC meet
regularly, the meetings have been rare. Palestinians argue that the lack of meetings
is due to Israel and vice versa. Israel made the decision to refrain from scheduling
JTC meetings because Palestine was thought to be “actively seeking solutions
outside of the Oslo framework.”126
C. Israel’s Interpretation of Article 36(D)(1)
The Oslo Accords were a step by both parties to alleviate some aspects of the
current conflict. Although Article 36 of Annex III of the Oslo Accords provides
Palestine with various rights and controls of its ICT sector, it has proven to be
inadequate, causing developmental problems for the country without much hope for
progress.
However, despite the rights listed above, a stipulation exists that requires
Palestine’s independence before any of these controls are granted. 127 Article
36(D)(1) outlines that the rights are “[p]ending the establishment of an independent
Palestinian telephone network.”128 Since Israel continues to control the majority of
Palestine’s ICT sector, Israel has made it impossible for Palestine to reach a point of
independency to build its own system.129 More specifically, Israel has only granted
Palestine access to build three fiber optic cables and two microwave links between
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which makes it impossible to build an independent
network.130
Although Israel recently granted access to Wataniya to operate in the Gaza Strip
and for 3G networks to operate in the West Bank, it continues to deny other
Palestinians’ requests for new ICT technologies in these areas.131 Israel has
specifically continued to deny requests for 4G networks but has granted approval of
these networks for six Israeli companies based on data from January 2015. 132
Resultingly, Palestinian companies have not been able to provide quality services to
their customers. For example, GPS, PayPal, and other applications are not accessible
on these networks, which forces Palestinians to rely on Israeli internet providers. 133

125. Carlo Maria Rossotto, Xavier Stéphane Decoster, Anat Lewin & Ihab Jabari, The
Telecommunication Sector in the Palestinian Territories: A Missed Opportunity for Economic
Development 26 (The World Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 104263, 2016).
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127. ABUDAKA, supra note 76, at 3.
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D. The Financial Impact of Palestine’s Lack of Development Progress
In 2014, the ICT sector was the least-contributing sector in the Palestinian
economy.134 It contributed 8% to the GDP in the West Bank and 0.4% in the Gaza
Strip.135 However, Figure 3 highlights that the industry has made some progress and
now surpasses both the “Transportation and Storage” and the “Households with
Employed Persons” sectors.136 The sector’s lack of contribution can be attributed to
political unrest and the fluctuations in available foreign aid.137
The Palestinian ICT sector employs around 5000 people in 250 companies in the
West Bank and Gaza.138 Around 40% of these companies export to international
markets. Based on a 2022 report, the total contribution of the ICT sector to the
Palestinian economy is about $493 million and accounted for about 3% of Palestine’s
GDP.139 The clear growth and development occurring within this sector called for a
higher demand of technology products and services. Jawwal and Wataniya have a
total of 4.3 million mobile subscribers.140
Between 2013 and 2015, Palestine has suffered a total revenue loss of $436 to
$1150 million USD.141 Additionally, the loss directly attributed to the absence of a
3G network is estimated to be between $339 and $742 million USD.142 Overall, this
represents an impact of about 3.0% of Palestine’s GDP.143

134. Hasan Z. Nuseibeh, Alan R. Hevner & Rosann W. Collins, What Can Be Controlled:
Actionable ICT4D in the Case of Palestine, 25 INFO. TECH. DEV. 390, 399 (2019).
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137. Nuseibeh et al., supra note 134.
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139. Anera on the Ground: The Tech Ecosystem in Palestine, ANERA (June 27, 2022),
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Figure 3: Percentage Contribution to GDP by Economic Activity in Palestine at
Current Prices, 2019

PayPal, specifically, has contributed to Palestine’s difficulty to develop
economically.144 PayPal is considered one of the leading online payment services
around the world, and it is unavailable for the approximately six million Palestinians
that reside in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, the app provides services
to Israelis, including those living in illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank,
proving the continued existence of discrimination. By providing these services to
Israelis, PayPal contributes to the economic sustainability of these areas while
indirectly contributing to the violation of international law. Additionally, by refusing
to extend its services to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it makes it difficult for
the creation of new business opportunities in the Palestinian market, thereby further
hindering Palestinian development.145
1. Israel’s Reliance on Civil and Military Law to Discriminate Against Palestinians
Although the Oslo Accords plays a significant role in the legal framework
governing the ICT sector, Israel technically has obligations under the law of
occupation and international human rights law toward Palestinians.146 In 1966, Israel
signed the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and ratified it in 1991; however, it has maintained that this legislation does

144. See HASHTAG PALESTINE 2020, 7AMLEH 1, 22 (E.M., Alison Carmel, trans., 2021).
145. Id.
146. MARWA FATAFTA & DIMA SAMARO, ACCESS NOW, EXPOSED AND EXPLOITED: DATA
PROTECTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 22 (2021).
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not extend to oPt because it does not apply extraterritorially. 147 Resultingly, Israel
instead relies on its civil and military laws to control the Palestinian population.
Israeli authorities “have deprived the nearly 2.5 million Palestinians they rule over
in the West Bank of their basic rights—rights enjoyed by the more than 400,000
Israeli settlers living in illegal settlements in the same territory.” 148 Specifically with
reference to social media, Israel uses its laws to discriminate against Palestinians.149
In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli government has tried Palestinians
with “incitement” in military courts under the Military Order 1651 sections 251(b)
and 199(c).150 In East Jerusalem, Israel has been more likely to apply its civil laws,
such as the “Law on Authorities for the Prevention of Committing Crimes Through
Use of an Internet Site,” which allow the district courts to fully or partially block
access to internet websites.151 Despite the different application, Israel looks to the
equivalent civil laws, specifically relying on Article 144 of the 1977 Penal Code on
“incitement to violence and terrorism.”152
2. Surveillance Concerns
Legislative bodies did not begin addressing surveillance legislation until the UN
Human Rights Committee did so in 2014.153 Nonetheless, Israel has mass surveyed
Palestinians for decades.154 Since the 1950s, Unit 8200, the Israeli army’s largest
unit, has been tasked with performing data collection and intercepting
communication signals.155 The extent of surveillance was detailed in a letter signed
in September 2014 by forty-three Israeli soldiers, which cited “‘widespread
surveillance of innocent civilians’ that the Israeli army used for ‘political
persecution’ and to recruit informants.”156
Israel has long used oPt as a laboratory for testing surveillance technologies.157
For example, the NSO Group recently began one such surveillance project, known
as the Pegasus Project, which allowed the surveillance of Palestinians to mark them
as potential targets.158 However, this serves as just one example of Israeli
surveillance of Palestinians. The Israeli army has also recently deployed Blue Wolf
facial recognition technology, which has incentivized Israeli soldiers to take pictures
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of Palestinian civilians and install Pegasus spyware onto Palestinian human rights
workers’ phones by offering rewards.159
Israel continues to tighten its hold on Palestinians, now using surveillance
technology to control their daily lives.160 In turn, this leads to violations of digital
rights, such as internet security, privacy, and freedom of expression.161 Similar to
Israel’s reasoning for data collection, the purpose of the cameras has been attributed
to advancing the scheme referred to as “Google Ayosh” to search and find
Palestinians to prevent terror attacks using data.162
An Israeli whistleblower recently revealed that any mobile device imported into
Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing is implanted with an Israeli bug, allowing
the government to listen to any phone conversation in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.163 Israel has also enhanced its use of video surveillance and facial recognition
software, which even allow the government to see into private homes.164 For
example, in early October 2019, Palestinians discovered a camouflaged camera,
manufactured by an Israeli company, Anyvision, used to monitor movements of
Palestinians.165 Resultingly, Palestinians no longer feel safe, leading women to sleep
in their hijabs and refusing to let their children play outside.166
3. Data Collection Concerns
Israel also uses national security as a reason to collect data from Palestinians. 167
Within the last several years, the Israeli army has begun collecting Palestinian data
at checkpoints to add to its anti-terror database.168 The project’s motivation was
described as a way “to deepen the occupation and protect the settlements.”169
Palestinian men must fill out forms with detailed information: “name, age, telephone
number, identification number, type of vehicle and license number.” 170 They must
also submit a photograph of their ID and provide information about the origin and
destination of the trip that led them to the checkpoint. 171 The Israeli soldiers are
required to submit 100 completed forms for each shift, exemplifying the immense
quota that they must meet.172
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Not only does the Israeli government collect Palestinian information from the
checkpoints, but it has also asked Palestinians to download an application—“Al
Munasiq” or “The Coordinator” in Arabic—onto their phones that allows the
military to access their data.173 This application allows the army to track the user’s
location and “access any notifications they receive, files they download or save, and
the device’s camera.”174 The terms of service also indicate that the data is to be used
with the sole discretion of the Israeli authorities.175 The Israeli government has
attributed this collection to security purposes.176 More specifically, the Israeli
Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) claimed that “the
app was developed for the benefit of the Palestinian public.” 177 However, lawyers
associated with Hamoked, an Israeli-based human rights organization, disputed this
fact, stating, “[t]he connection between clarifying the status of the permits and
revealing private information is unclear.”178 Israel continues to successfully collect
data from Palestinians without any repercussions for these human rights and privacy
violations.
4. The Impact of International Social Media Companies
International social media companies also contribute to Palestine’s lack of
development.179 In 2015, the Israeli government developed the Cyber Unit and
tasked it with overseeing social media.180 Between May 6 and May 19, 2021, there
were 500 cases of digital rights violations of Palestinians documented. 181 There were
several types of violations: “content takedown, closing accounts, hiding hashtags . .
. reducing the reachability to specific content, deleting of archived content, and
restricting access and removing accounts.”182 Among the various social media
platforms, 50% of violations stemmed from Instagram, 35% from Facebook, 11%
from Twitter, and 1% from TikTok.183 Although these social media companies have
removed much of this content without repercussions, Israelis are still able to use
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social media as a way to voice their negative opinions toward the Arabs.184 Between
2019 and 2020 there was a 16% increase in violent discourse.185
a. Instagram
The most prominent digital rights violation seen within Instagram is the removal
of stories from accounts, which makes up 45% of all violations reported.186 Most
content removal was not followed by any reason or notice of the deletion. 187
However, if a reason was given, Instagram primarily described the content as “hate
speech” or “against community standards.”188 Overall, out of the 250 violations
reported, only 12 cases saw restored content.189
b. Facebook
Facebook has been working with Israeli authorities since 2016 to censor
content.190 For example, in October 2017, a Palestinian worker was arrested for
posting “good morning” in Arabic on his Facebook account because it was
mistakenly translated to “attack them” in Hebrew and “hurt them” in English. 191 In
the first half of 2018, Facebook received 624 requests from Israeli authorities to
remove content and granted 73% of these requests.192 Facebook’s algorithm deletes
posts containing specific words without any check for context, such as the algorithm
checks for the words “Hamas, Jihad, Saraya, and Jabha Sha’bya,” which all refer to
Palestinian political groups.193 In total, there were 370 documented violations on
Facebook, resulting in the largest number of removals of Palestinian content from
any social media platform.194
c. Other Discrimination Within Media Sources
Other companies also contribute to Israel’s economic progress while indirectly
inhibiting Palestine’s development.195 YouTube has removed Palestinian accounts
and channels.196 Additionally, Google Maps follows an Israeli narrative by neither
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including Palestinian areas that are not recognized by Israeli authorities nor using
terms related to Palestine or oPt.197 However, illegal Israeli settlements are featured
on the app and are falsely labeled as part of Israel. Lastly, checkpoints, roadblocks,
and Israeli settler bypass roads are not displayed, and Israeli routes are used rather
than Palestinian ones. These facts further show Google’s discrimination toward
Palestinians.198
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO POSITIVELY REINFORCE PALESTINE’S FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ICT SECTOR
A. Legislative Approach
Unfortunately, legislation has not been successful in providing a framework for
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically regarding the ICT sector. Although the
Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention both govern the rights of
occupied territories, occupation comes in many different forms.199 When the current
legislation was written, technology was not a concern; therefore, expansion or
clarification is necessary.
Article 42 of the Hague Convention specifically states: “Territory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The
occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and in a
position to assert itself.”200 Due to the statute’s vagueness, Yuval Shany developed
a three-prong test to determine whether a territory is occupied: “(a) hostile troops are
physically present in the area; (b) troops are capable of exercising effective powers
of government; (c) the legitimate government is incapable of exercising effective
powers of government.”201 However, neither of these frameworks acknowledges the
role that technology plays in occupation.
Technology’s newfound role in occupation pressures policymakers to enact a new
framework to avoid further ambiguity. 202 Colin Picker developed thirty-two
questions that policymakers should be asking when confronted with technological
pressures.203 Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the main questions to be
considered include the following:
• “Is the technology developing or changing rapidly?;”204
• “Is the technology sufficiently mature for policy makers to consider?;”205
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• “Would an international institution be better able to handle the dynamism of
the technology than individual states acting pursuant to a treaty?;”206 and
• “Are all participating countries equally informed about the technology?” 207
Although all of the questions that Picker poses provide a level of importance,
those listed above seem to provide an opportunity for discourse on the most
controversial issues of Israel’s control over Palestine’s ICT sector. To provide further
guidance, Professor Asaf Lubin identified five recurring principles that govern one’s
right to privacy: (1) the principle of legality; (2) the principle of necessity; (3) the
principle of proportionality; (4) the principle of adequate safeguards; and (5) the
principle of access to remedy.208 These five principles provide a further framework
for courts to consider when deciding if one’s right to privacy has been breached.
B. International Support
Additionally, it is crucial for Palestine to receive support from the international
community.209 International institutions, such as the European Union, and other
countries, like the United States, have certain influence that could help create more
awareness and bring enforcement to Palestinian claims.210 For example, the
government of Japan has already committed to helping Palestine in their quest for
further development.211 In May 2019, Japan donated $32,983,034 USD to Palestine.
This donation was targeted toward many areas of development, one being ICT sector
development. Japan is determined to provide financial and technological means to
assist Palestine’s national development plan. In total, Japan has contributed around
$1.9 billion USD since 1993.212 Japan’s contributions prove the impact that
international players can have on Palestine’s development.
Support can also come from organizations in the private sector that invest in
Palestine’s ICT sector.213 Companies currently investing in an “apolitical” way have
prolonged the situation of Israel controlling this sector for its own benefit. 214 Those
in the private sector must invest in ways that will allow Palestine to develop its
industries and challenge the dominance that Israel has over it. Additionally, the
private sector may further Palestine’s development by outsourcing projects to it, or
by supporting start-up companies. These opportunities would allow Palestine to
establish secure relationships with various members of the international community
and continue to promote foreign investment into its ICT sector.215
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C. Trending Hashtags
International actors, however, must first be made aware of the human rights
violations occurring for Palestine to receive any desired support. One way to achieve
this awareness may be by using hashtags.216 The use of hashtags has already sparked
controversy, creating an avenue for potential change in areas experiencing violations.
For example, Palestinians protested inhuman Israeli prison conditions for Palestinian
political prisoners through “#DignityStrike” that was used in April 2017. 217 A
compromise was then reached between Israeli and Palestinian authorities. 218
The use of hashtags has also been seen to promote awareness of human rights
violations within the private sector.219 Hyundai was known to provide machinery to
Israeli authorities that was used in destroying the homes of Palestinians in various
Israeli villages. The use of “#BoycottHyundai” called Hyundai “to end its
involvement in Israel’s “ethnic cleansing of Palestinian communities in Jerusalem
and the Naqab.”220 By using this hashtag, the campaign sought to cut Hyundai sales
while calling on Korean labor unions to pressure Hyundai into ending its
involvement in these violations.221 Overall, with the increased use of social media,
hashtags can be used as a tool to implement change in both the public and private
sectors.
D. Steps at the Local Level
While working to ensure progress in these other areas, Palestine could most
quickly make progress at the local level without waiting for help from international
actors.222 In the areas under its direct control, it could ensure that certain technology
is installed to guarantee better coverage and ensure citywide Wi-Fi. An additional
solution lies with mesh wireless networks, which are not dependent on centrally
located towers, and can bypass obstacles, such as the hills that currently cause
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problems with the networks.223 By working on local solutions, Palestine can create
change without waiting for other countries or entities to contribute.
It has also been argued that Palestinian university graduates do not frequently
enter into the ICT sector for various reasons.224 More specifically, it can be attributed
to travel restrictions, unawareness of post-graduation ICT jobs, lack of innovative
skills, outdated teaching methods, and lack of resources.225 In order to continue
Palestinian development, the education system must also meet modern-day demands
by “maintaining a harmonious relationship with advances in science, technology,
and information and implanting the tools to ensure the continuance of knowledgebuilding.”226
CONCLUSION
The story of occupation has historically been told by analyzing the restriction of
people’s ability to travel when living in an occupied territory. Although the
construction of the Israeli-Palestinian separation barrier proves that the conflict
continues to exist in this traditional definition of occupation, the modern-day story
of occupation should be told through a different lens: the violation of one’s right to
privacy.227 Under multiple sources of international law, including the Oslo Accords,
Israel is required to grant Palestine, the occupied territory, certain rights. Examples
of this legislation, although contested, include the Hague Convention and the Fourth
Geneva Convention.228 However, according to customary international law, the
occupier is generally allowed to act in anticipatory self-defense if an attack is
imminent.229 Resultingly, Israel’s motives and the harms to Palestinians must be
balanced.230
The differences in situations that trigger questions of occupation law and the
distinct cultures around the world lead to difficulties to enact a universal statute to
handle controversies related to technology and data privacy in occupied territories.
Rather, many factors, including those listed above, should be used to provide courts
with the opportunity to decide consistently with their own cultures and societies. It
may also be beneficial to consider possible explanations for differences in data
privacy concerns, which are not limited to but could include differences in: (1)
cultural values; (2) internet experiences; and/or (3) the role of political institutions. 231
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The HCJ has already expressed its willingness to use a proportionality structure
in relation to occupation law through its separation barrier case decisions.232 In order
to make any progress in the conflict regarding Israel’s control over Palestine’s ICT
sector, the questions developed by Picker, the factors provided by Lubin, and the
possible explanations for differing cultures’ varied data privacy concerns should all
be considered by the courts in future cases.233 As Israel continues to tighten its hold
around this sector as a result of the ongoing conflict, it is time for those, both
internationally and locally, to enact a solution to protect both Palestine’s and future
occupied territories’ freedom to control their own ICT sectors.
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